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Teaching Practical Business Ethics
Kurt S. Schulzke, Kennesaw State University
Every ethical dilemma embodies three central questions:
What is the optimal ethical outcome? Why should I want the
best ethical outcome? Can I achieve the best outcome while
preserving professional and personal relationships and, if so,
how? Legislative, scholarly, and pedagogical responses to
recent ethical and financial scandals involving companies like
Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, Parmalat, and Ahold have focused
almost exclusively on the first two questions, leaving the
third unanswered. This article engages the third question by
presenting a pedagogical tool for encouraging executives to
personalize and operationalize business ethics.
Introduction
In addition to the information expressly required to be included in a statement
or report, there shall be added such further material information, if any, as may be
necessary to make the required statements, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made not misleading (Securities and Exchange Commission, 1965).
SEC Rule 12b-20 formalizes a longstanding principle of behavior in common
law countries that it is ethically wrong to mislead people in ways that affect their
decisions. In a more technical, legalistic sense, Rule 12b-20 says that if any
statement or report filed with the SEC is misleading when prepared in compliance
with detailed SEC regulations, which include Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP), then the reporting entity is obligated to provide whatever
additional textual or numeric information is needed to ensure that the statement
or report is “not misleading.” While the essence of this rule has been a part of the
common law ethical tradition for centuries, it was first formally included in the
U.S. Code of Federal Regulations in 1965.
Now consider this e-mail exchange (Wall Street Journal, 2002) between two
Andersen partners involved in the Enron audit:
[David]—Setting aside the accounting, the idea of a venture
entity managed by CFO is terrible from a business point of
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view. Conflicts of interest galore. Why would any director in
his or her right mind ever approve such a scheme? Plus, even if
all the accounting obstacles below are overcome, it’s a related
party, which means FAS 57 disclosures of all transactions.
Would Enron want these transactions disclosed every year as
related party transactions in their financial statements?—[Ben]
[Ben]—I agree with all the points you and John raise except
for two where I need some more help. But first, on your point
(i.e., the whole thing is a bad idea). I really couldn’t agree more.
Rest assured that I have already communicated and it has been
agreed to by [Enron Finance VP] Andy [Fastow] that CEO,
General Counsel, and Board discussion and approval will be
a requirement, on our part, for acceptance of a venture similar
to what we have been discussing. Rick is insistent of such
communication also. You should also know that none of this
communication has yet to occur and this thing could get killed
when it does. This thing is still very much in the brainstorming
stage, but Andy wants to move through it very quickly to get all
this done, if possible, this quarter. Andy is convinced that this is
such a win-win that everyone will buy in. We’ll see….
If we can clear the hurdle of Enron not consolidating this venture,
help me to defeat gain accounting on Enron transactions where
approval of the transaction is controlled by the nonrelated
owners and fairness opinions will be obtained for all. I’m not
saying I’m in love with this either, but I’ll need all the ammo I
can get to take that issue on….
I’m still working with him to figure out how exactly this will
work and accomplish his objectives.
—David
This electronic interchange occurred between May 28 and June 1, 1999, more
than two years before the SEC announced its initial Enron inquiry. Close analysis
reveals professional auditors who recognized that the CFO of a major client
corporation was asking them to endorse a transaction that they were convinced was
bad for the client’s business and embodied serious ethical, if not legal, concerns.
“Conflicts of interest galore. Why would any director in his or her right mind ever
approve such a scheme?” Yet at that moment in time, despite his own conviction
that the “scheme” was a bad one, the lead auditor appeared ready to go along if
the CEO, General Counsel, and Board gave it their blessing. He had much to lose
by violating SEC rules or by looking the other way while Enron’s executives and
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directors did so. Yet, the record indicates in the end he could not bring himself to
say in a convincing way, “SEC rules and my professional obligations to you and
the public do not permit me to endorse this transaction or the proposed disclosure.
Let’s find a better way.” Why not?
Catch-22
The personal, professional, and financial-market consequences of this
and other similar failures to demonstrate timely ethical leadership are now
legendary. Many such scenarios played themselves out during the same time
period at a variety of companies around the globe. In virtually all of these cases,
professionals and executives of various categories faced an apparent Catch-22:
say “yes” and lose their professional souls, risking their professional standing
and reputation; or, on the other hand, say “no” and thereby lose a key client
relationship and thereby their income stream and professional standing. Faced
with this dilemma, many executives follow the path of short-term least resistance
and run with the crowd.
It is unlikely that the deluge of post-Enron regulation and enforcement will
substantially change the reality or immediacy of this Catch-22. History suggests,
despite the broad political support that drove the U.S. Congress to enact SarbanesOxley, only the canonical location of the legal hotspot will change. Unless business
executives and professional advisors find strategies to do the right thing, they will
continue to behave unethically and violate the law.
Michael (2006) argues that regulatory and scholarly attention has been
misdirected toward the substance of the rules and should be refocused toward
ethical coping skills:
To be ethical, our intention to do the ethical thing must be followed by
our really doing it. Thus, individuals who…have recognized an ethical issue,
decided on an ethical response, and resolved to act on it, still need to contend
with pressures and other obstacles that interfere with actually implementing
their decision. (p. 490)
Ethics training cannot be limited to helping employees decide on the
ethics of a situation, but, rather, must help employees to cope with those
corporate dynamics that make doing the right thing difficult. (p. 496)
In other words, we have more than enough rules. It is time now to learn
to live them. Bos concurs, noting that “rather than calling for strong values, it
might be better to remind people of the skills that enable them to handle moral
disagreement, contradiction and doubt” (Bos, 2002, p. 66). This article offers
a simple descriptive-prescriptive written assignment, based on psychological
influence theory elucidated primarily by Cialdini (2001) designed to instill in
executive MBA and other business students the skills and confidence required to
behave ethically despite potentially countervailing corporate dynamics.
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The assignment requires three steps. First, the student writes a one- or twopage description of an actual workplace situation in which she or a co-worker
was pressured to do something unethical. Next, she analyzes the interaction
among the players in terms of Cialdini’s influence framework. Finally, the student
reexamines the situation through a prescriptive lens, mapping the influence
landscape (Watkins, 2001) and suggesting how the player of interest could, in a
future similar encounter, improve the ethical and relationship outcomes by using
Cialdini’s principles on key decision makers. Preservation of integrity is the
paramount objective, but maintenance of the client or employment relationship
is also highly desirable. Strategies that offer the possibility of preserving both
integrity and the relationship may enhance the likelihood of ethical behavior.
The remainder of this article proceeds with a short overview of Cialdini’s
influence principles and presentation of an illustrative assignment including fact
scenario, analysis, and prescriptive commentary.
Influence Principles
In this section of the article, I summarize Cialdini (2001) in six paragraphs,
one for each of Cialdini’s principles1 of influence: reciprocity, commitment
and consistency, social proof, liking, authority, and scarcity. The essence of
the influence paradigm, which Cialdini documents with citations to empirical
research and anecdotes, is that six fundamental psychological principles
subconsciously guide people in their daily lives, leading them to respond in a
quasi-mechanical fashion to specific external stimuli (Cialdini, 2001). In relation
to each principle, known psychological stimuli activate what amount to hardcoded behavioral scripts that can be stopped only by significant, timely, and
conscious effort (Cialdini, 2001). The six principles work as described in the
following paragraphs. I describe each of the principles here positively, in terms
of the conditions that lead to a “yes” response. However, conditions opposite to
those described will similarly generate a “no” response.
The reciprocity principle states that A is more likely to say “yes” to B if B
has previously delivered, solicited or unsolicited, some value to A (Cialdini, 2001).
For this purpose, “value” includes tangible and intangible goods. Almost anything
works: from a flower2 to a small compliment, and from buying A lunch to sending
A a greeting card that says simply “I like you.”3 Corollaries are that reciprocity
often trumps other influence principles and that a small initial transfer of value often
triggers a disproportionately large reciprocal transfer. Additionally, a concession in
the form of a retreat from an unreasonable initial offer may serve as an initial transfer
of value. The best defense against manipulative invocations of reciprocity is for the
initial recipient to recognize the manipulation and therefore internally qualify the
value transfer as deserving no reciprocal response (Cialdini, 2001).
Commitment and consistency rely on the universal human psychological
craving for consistency in “words, beliefs, attitudes, and deeds” (Cialdini, 2001, p.
95). Consistency is partly an effort to streamline decision making (Cialdini, 2001).
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Commitment is a closely related concept in the sense that it streamlines decision
making in relation to a particular person or chosen course of action. Once A makes an
initial small commitment to B, as in agreeing to accept a “free” night at a timeshare
property, A is more likely to say “yes” to even larger requests made by B. Likewise,
commitment to an erroneous course of action often leads to over commitment in
which the subject “throws good money after bad” because of emotional attachment
to the erroneous initial decision (Cialdini, 2001). Written and public manifestations
of commitment (e.g., press conferences, signing formal agreements) strengthen
commitment, in part, by enhancing accountability (Cialdini, 2001). Defenses to
manipulative use of consistency and commitment include heeding “stomach signs”
and “heart of heart signs,” respectively, when (a) “we realize that we are being
pushed by consistency or commitment” to do something that we know at a gut level
is wrong or undesirable, or (b) it is not immediately clear, at a gut level, that the
initial commitment is erroneous (Cialdini, 2001).
Social proof influences the subject to follow the crowd. The larger the crowd,
the more powerful is the automatic impulse (Cialdini, 2001). Social proof works
most effectively under conditions of ambiguity (when the requested course of
actions is not clearly erroneous) and when the subject perceives members of the
crowd to be similar to the subject (Cialdini, 2001). In other words, CPA partners
at Firm XYZ who graduated from Kennesaw State University are more likely to
follow the lead of other partners at Firm XYZ who are also KSU alumni than they
are to follow Firm ABC partners or BYU alumni. Defenses to social proof include
recognizing counterfeit evidence of (a) similarity and (b) what similar others are
doing; remembering that social proof has a long history of leading people to do
destructive things; and keeping mind that the majority can be wrong and even people
who are intelligent and sincerely motivated can make bad choices (Cialdini, 2001).
The liking principle influences A to say “yes” to B when A knows and likes
B (Cialdini 2001). Factors that tend to increase the liking quotient include B’s
perceived physical attractiveness, similarity to A, increased familiarity through
repeated (usually positive) contact with A, and “liking by association” (Cialdini,
2001). Associative liking results from B’s association, in A’s mind, with people,
things, or events that A perceives as positive or favorable (Cialdini, 2001). A’s
best defense to the liking principle is to mentally separate B from B’s request and
to evaluate the request on its objective merits (Cialdini, 2001).
The authority principle holds that people tend to automatically obey the orders
or follow the lead of those whom they perceive to be authority figures, even to the
extent of arbitrarily inflicting severe pain on others (Cialdini, 2001). Symbols of
authority, including titles, clothing, and cars, can lead subjects to falsely conclude
that the person in possession of the symbol is a legitimate authority to be followed or
obeyed (Cialdini, 2001). Illegitimate authority figures sometimes attempt to create
an aura of trustworthiness by freely disclosing minor negative information about
themselves (Cialdini, 2001). Defenses to authority include carefully examining
the evidence of authority status (valid credentials and genuine knowledge of the
subject matter) and, assuming the evidence supports the formal claim of authority,
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examining the authority’s motivations for making this request (is the authority
acting in a self-interested or arbitrary fashion) (Cialdini, 2001).
According to the scarcity principle, people value more highly things, people,
and freedoms that are scarce or unavailable (Cialdini, 2001). Additionally, we
value more highly that which has become “newly scarce” than that which has been
scarce for an extended period of time (Cialdini, 2001). Scarcity is directly related to
psychological reactance theory, according to which we respond to the loss of liberties
and associated goods by wanting them more than we did before their loss (Cialdini,
2001). This principle drives knowing employers to emphasize to new hires that their
status is probationary for several weeks or months at the front end of an employment
relationship. Employees who are let go during probation are less likely to sue for
wrongful termination than those who perceive that they are no longer probationary.
Assignment Illustration
Fact Scenario
The following scenario, originally written by an executive MBA student,
presents a multiparty situation in which many players at a vendor company
collaborated on an important bid and then concocted an invoicing subterfuge
whereby their company billed the customer for services that the customer did
not want. Where necessary to preserve anonymity, I have altered identifying
information. To enhance readability, I have changed some of the wording. However,
I have left the account in first person to retain its immediacy and personality:
A few years ago, when the growth of large e-commerce web sites was
still a somewhat new phenomenon, our company was bidding to design
and implement just such a website. This was the first large e-commerce
implementation attempted by our company. The deal, if successful, would
create a reference site and demonstrate our company’s ability to deploy
large-scale e-commerce solutions. Every major competitor was bidding on
this solution. Winning this deal and successfully implementing it would
provide an advantage in bidding on other major projects. After this deal was
declared a “must win” by management, the account team felt they needed to
do whatever was necessary to win the contract.
The project included hardware, software, consulting services, and one
year of support. The customer had been presented several draft proposals
breaking down the cost by major category. They had not seen a detailed order
form with specific part numbers and prices.
During the negotiation, the customer stated a maximum cost amount that
they were willing to pay for first-year support services. It was clear that the
customer saw real value in our consulting services, but did not feel the same
way about the first year of support. Our account team analyzed the customer’s
situation and thought otherwise. The account team was sure that our proposal
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would not succeed unless the customer committed to a significantly higher
investment in first-year support.
The sales team had worked hard to analyze the support requirements
and thought they understood the customer’s needs better than the customer
did. The team was concerned that failing to deliver adequate support would
prevent the e-commerce solution from working effectively. If the web site
was not successful, our company’s reputation could be damaged. Therefore,
we decided that we would deliver adequate support even if the customer did
not pay for it. Since we were going to deliver the support, our support team
wanted additional revenue from the deal. In light of the customer’s refusal to
pay for more support, the account team had to come up with a creative way
to fund the first-year support.
At this point, the sales team suggested that we “manufacture”
consulting activities, which the customer perceived as valuable, and then
bill the customer for these fake activities, internally recoding the resulting
revenue from consulting services to first-year support. In this way, the
project would succeed, the customer would be happy and the support
team would get its revenue.
Descriptive Analysis
In this scenario, the writer was under pressure to participate in a scheme to
fraudulently extract fees from a customer for support services that the customer
did not wish to buy. We can see all six influence principles operating on the
subject. Management viewed the contract and its associated benefits as scarce
and therefore highly valuable. This drove management to label the deal a “must
win,” a statement that sales, account, consulting, and support teams are likely
interpreted as direction from authority to win the contract no matter what the
cost. Commitment and consistency worked on everyone involved to obey
management as they had done in the past and to behave in a manner consistent
with stock organizational values such as loyalty and teamwork. If commitment
and consistency were not enough, reciprocity, liking, and scarcity were working
overtime in different combinations on different individuals, driving them to play
along with the scheme in hopes of receiving positive payback of one kind or
another down the road. Consistency also required that the account team follow
company norms ensuring sufficient first-year support for all such contracts. Once
a few players, especially key opinion leaders (de facto authorities, with or without
authoritative titles), have agreed to the plan, social proof will drive others to join
the fraudulent enterprise.
Ethical Prescription
Let us call the subject Dana, a member of the account team. Under such
circumstances, the pressure on Dana to just go along is almost overpowering.
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Assume that Dana has decided that ethically the best outcomes are (a) to persuade
the customer that first-year support is essential to the value of the contract and get
the customer to agree to pay for it or, (b) failing customer agreement, to persuade
Dana’s corporate peers to either back out of the project or accept it without the
first-year support feature. For this discussion, we should also assume that Dana
feels sufficiently motivated to achieve outcome (a) or (b). She wants to behave
ethically. As a last resort, she is prepared to resign from the company and find
employment elsewhere. The only remaining question is how she should go about
pushing the organization in the direction of (a) or (b).
First, timing is critical because as the plan develops and more people commit
themselves to it, commitment, consistency, scarcity, and social proof will all work
against any attempt to redirect the momentum. Here, a sailing metaphor applies.
With relatively little effort early in the voyage, the skipper can effect a small
course correction with outsized impact on the ultimate destination. However,
the further into the voyage the correction is applied, the more effort and cost are
required to get the ship back on track. Note, however, that ethical and nautical
voyages differ in at least one important way. Errors in nautical navigation are
usually soon forgotten unless the ship founders or sinks. In contrast, errors in
corporate ethical navigation tend to have lasting consequences for companies and
individuals in terms of ethics, law, morale, relationships, and reputation. Thus, the
earlier in the process Dana begins her efforts to persuade, the greater her chances
of success and the lower the costs.
Second, Dana needs to “map the influence landscape” (Watkins, 2001). In a
complex, multiparty situation such as this, it is important to identify and evaluate
each player in the drama before attempting to persuade anyone. Persuasion is
accomplished by winning over individuals, not groups. However, as more key
individuals join an endeavor, it will typically reach a tipping point (Gladwell, 2000)
beyond which persuasion of additional individuals happens almost automatically
through social proof making further conscious recruitment unnecessary. To
achieve this result, it is most effective to persuade opinion leaders in the influence
landscape (Watkins, 2001) first because once persuaded, they will persuade others
and push the enterprise more quickly toward the tipping point.
In prioritizing her persuasion targets, Dana will also need to consider
the status of her influence accounts, especially liking and reciprocity, with
each target. Because of her relatively low position in the organizational
hierarchy, she is unlikely to enjoy much in the way of authority. The softest
targets will be those who like Dana and owe her a favor. She may want to
find subtle ways to increase those balances before beginning to negotiate
over the ethics question.
Assume that Dana identifies Bob, the account team leader, as her first
persuasion target. She can further improve her odds with Bob by knowing
the authoritative norms and standards of the company, Bob’s team, and Bob
personally. If Bob’s personal ethics, company policy, or team practice require
honesty and transparency, Dana can privately draw such norms to Bob’s
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attention and give him the opportunity to reaffirm his commitment to them. In
this context, it is important to keep in mind that voluntary commitments have
greater influence power than involuntary ones. Thus, Dana should avoid using
threats or other forms coercion at this stage. They may be necessary later, but
not in the early going.
One approach to Bob might begin with Dana inviting Bob to lunch. At lunch,
the dialogue might go something like this:
Dana: Bob, I am really excited about the opportunity to bid on this web site. I
want it to be a big success. I think we are headed in the right direction.
Bob: I agree. It’s a great opening for us.
Dana: I was wondering. Are you comfortable with the sales team’s proposal
for dealing with the first-year support issue?
Bob: Well, I’m not sure. What do you mean?
Dana: Do you feel that the sales team’s proposal is consistent with our
company norms?
Bob: Well, maybe not, but this is a special situation. Desperate times call for
desperate measures. It should only be necessary this once. After this, future
clients will be willing to pay full rates.
Dana: I have always appreciated your leadership and example. In the long
run, don’t you think we will make more money and sleep better at night if we
follow our company norms?
Bob: You’re probably right, but still . . .
Dana: What about your personal norms? Don’t you feel that this approach
might violate them? I know they would violate mine. I don’t think that any
deal is more valuable than my reputation for integrity. I don’t want to pressure
you, but I would consider it a personal favor if you would agree to work with
me on an alternative to the sales team’s idea.
Bob: Well, OK. What do you have in mind?
This upbeat approach makes a sincere attempt at addressing the underlying
ethical concerns while preserving the relationship. Rather than focusing on
authority or scarcity, as threats normally do, here Dana emphasizes liking and
reciprocity. Under the circumstances, her positive, low key, complimentary attitude
and her willingness to give Bob space to agree voluntarily serve as concessions,

40

Journal of Executive Education

worthy of reciprocation. Dana’s allusion to norms and standards, and possibly her
own credibility, bring authority and commitment and consistency principles into
action, but not in a heavy-handed way.
By clearly identifying herself as committed to ethical conduct, she may break
the spell of social proof and drive it in the opposite direction, in essence flipping
social proof in her favor. Bob can no longer believe that everybody is on board
with the sales team’s scheme. If Bob is listening, he will also realize that Dana,
too, is committed to ethical action and that the opportunity to work with her is
scarce because she will not wait around forever for him to get on board.
By asking Bob to verbally agree to craft an alternative Dana breaks his
commitment, if any, to the sales team approach and commits him to work with
her. This small commitment can be leveraged into a larger one down the road.
Dana may want to solidify Bob’s commitment by sending Bob an e-mail that
memorializes the essence of their agreement in a nonlegalistic, nonthreatening
way without reference to the fraudulent aspects of the sales team proposal.
Skeptics may be tempted to dismiss this approach as idealistic and
impractical. Some may say that ordinary people in such circumstances cannot
be expected to act so courageously. While I cannot, at present, offer empirical
proof, I have successfully followed similar strategies repeatedly with clients,
colleagues, and students over nearly 20 years as a CPA, attorney, and business
professor. Sometimes, the subject has to find other employment and rupture
some relationships, but just as often ethics and relationships are simultaneously
preserved. I have seen this approach work many times.
From a pedagogical standpoint, as a corporate trainer and college professor,
I have used this pedagogical tool with considerable success over a period of more
than five years with hundreds of MBA and executive MBA students. Anecdotally,
I am satisfied that it fills a pressing need in the business ethics curriculum and
achieves the objectives for which it is designed.
Optional Steps
To further enhance the value of the assignment, the instructor may wish to
(a) select one or two scenarios for classroom role plays, (b) assign individual
teams to provide analysis and prescriptive commentary of selected scenarios, or
(c) privately discuss scenarios with students.
Conclusion
The objective of this article was to outline a simple pedagogical tool to help
instill in executive MBA and other business students the skills and confidence
required to behave ethically despite potentially countervailing corporate dynamics.
The tool just described achieves these objectives by (a) encouraging students to
reflect on actual workplace situations of which they have personal knowledge,
(b) providing an analytical persuasion framework through which students can
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evaluate the organizational and interpersonal dynamics present in such ethical
situations and develop strategies for dealing with those dynamics in ways that
preserve individual integrity and interpersonal relationships. Knowing something
about how persuasion works can encourage otherwise reticent ethicists to take a
stand when it matters most.
Notes
Cialdini (2001) calls them “weapons of influence.” I prefer the term “principles” because of its
less confrontational tone.
2
The flower ploy was used routinely as a fundraising tactic in airport lounges by a well-known
religious sect, during the last quarter of the 20th century. Adherents would force a flower on an
unsuspecting traveler who would then feel obligated to reciprocate with a monetary contribution.
The donor would then toss the flower in the trash can, from which the adherent would retrieve it for
imposition on his next target (Cialdini 2001).
1

Cialdini (2001) discusses the greeting card example in the context of the liking principle
but greeting cards also stimulate reciprocity.
3
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